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THE REAL DOCTRINE & COVENANTS 
Chad J. Pomeroy* 
ABSTRACT 
Developers have recently begun creating, and attaching to the property they 
sell to consumers, what is known as a "recovery fee." These recovery fees are 
"new" in that most lawyers are not familiar with them and in that they seem to 
operate in a novel manner and are bottomed on novel claims. In essence, they 
create and levy a fee on subsequent owners each time the property is transferred, 
which fee purports to reimburse developers for infrastructure and other 
development costs. Because they seem new, and because they involve transfers 
from relatively smal/ and unsophisticated parties to relatively large and more 
sophisticated parties, they have engendered substantial controversy and 
opposition. 
But they are not really new. They are actually simply a type of covenant, 
condition, and restriction. Covenants are among the most basic property concepts 
studied by most first-year property students. These recovery fees are merely a new 
type of covenant that has recently emerged as a new tool for real property 
developers to generate additional revenues. 
This Article primarily seeks to describe these recovery fees, to place them in 
their proper context within the extant universe of known encumbrances, and to 
warn legislators and lawyers against overreacting to them through a flurry of 
unnecessary and ultimately unhelpful laws. The Article does this by describing 
recovery fees and the various "solutions" that states have begun promulgating in 
response thereto. This desire for solutions is understandable, as recovery fees do 
pose some problems, but, I argue, these problems arise not from the intrinsic 
nature of these covenants, but from the manner in which our recording system 
accomplishes its notice function. Though entirely statutory in nature, the 
recording system effectively relies upon history and custom such that a new 
variation on even a well-established property interest or encumbrance can 
undermine notice. Therefore, I ultimately suggest a restrained solution that both 
ensures notice and avoids the difficulties associated with imprudent laws and 
prohibitions. I conclude that this restrained solution, by working within the 
context of existing notice structures, will minimize any confusion associated with 
recovery fees by maximizing the flow of information and eliminating the need for 
unwarranted and confusing laws and restrictions. 
• Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law.
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I. lNTRODUCTION
Assume for a moment that you are a lawyer reviewing a real estate 
transaction for a client. Y ou rnight be doing title work, advising on a 
purehase, helping with due diligence, or performing some combination of 
these services. In exarnining the documents record ed against the property, 
you come across an oddly named instrument called "Financing and 
Reimbursement of Infrastructure and Improvements." Y ou have never seen 
anything like that before, and it has language that gives you pause, but you 
review the prelirninary report from the title company and, seeing no 
corresponding exceptions to title, you move on.1 This is not good 
lawyering-but it is certainly a scenario one could imagine, given that many 
lawyers look for common encumbrances and rely on title companies to 
pinpoint problematic title issues. Unfortunately, a year after the transaction 
closes, that reliance is shattered when your client calls you and asks why she 
has started to receive annual invoices from the original developer of the 
property. The answer is that you have just unknowingly encountered a new 
sort of encumbrance called a "recovery fee." 
1. A preliminary title report is one of the names for the initial report prepared by
a title insurance company that describes title and defines the scope of title insurance the 
company is willing to issue. See l C.J.S. Abstracts of Title § 2, Westlaw ( database updated 
Dec. 2016). A preliminary title report differs from an abstract of title, upon which one 
can legally rely, but it is often presented in the same manner, and it is primarily used by 
title insurance companies to induce stake holders to purehase title insurance. See id. §§ 2, 
21. An "exception" to title is anything that constitutes a claim against, or encumbrance
upon, the status of the title of the property at issue. See, e.g., AM. LAND nTLE Ass'N,
OWNER'S POLICY OF nTLE INSURANCE 1 (2006), http://www.waynecountytitle.
com/sites/default/files/ ALT AOwnersPolicy.pdf.
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I say "new" because most lawyers are not familiar with recovery fees 
and so might run into the problem outlined above. But they are not really 
new. They seein so because they operate in a novel manner and are 
bottomed on novel claims, but they are actually a type of encumbrance 
commonly referred to as "covenants, conditions, and restrictions"­
"covenant" in this Article.2 Covenants are among the most basic property 
concepts, studied by most first-year property students,3 and these recovery 
fees are simply a new type of covenant that has recently emerged as a new 
tool for real property developers to generate additional revenues. This 
Article primarily seeks to describe these "recovery fees,"4 to place them in 
their proper context within the extant universe of known encumbrances, and 
to warn legislators and lawyers against overreacting to them through a flurry 
of unnecessary and ultimately unhelpful laws. Part II describes recovery fees 
and the various "solutions" that states have begun promulgating in response 
thereto. Of course, the desire for· solutions is understandable, as recovery 
fees do pose some problems, which Part III acknowledges. These problems 
arise not from the intrinsic nature of these covenants but from the manner 
in which our recording system accomplishes its notice function. Though 
entirely statutory in nature, the recording system effectively relies upon 
history and custom such that a new variation on even a well-established 
property interest or encumbrance can undermine notice. As such, Part IV 
suggests a restrained solution that both ensures notice and avoids the 
difficulties associated with the imprudent laws and prohibitions counseled 
2. The phrase "covenant, condition, and restriction" is the same with or without
an Oxford comma. Often referred to by the acronym "CCR," I prefer the term 
"covenant" because it is easier to use. I mean by this term, however, to refer to a "real 
covenant," which is what most people probably mean when they use the term CCR. 
3. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 894 (8th ed. 2014). Note that
"equitable servitudes" are closely related cousins of covenants. See id. at 892-94. For 
purposes of this Article, however, I will focus on real covenants, as the requirements 
thereof are slightly broader than those of equitable servitudes, and I will, as indicated 
above, generally utilize the phrase "covenants." See also, e.g., infra note 35 and 
accompanying text. 
4. These can also be called transfer fee covenants, capital recovery fees,
reconveyance fees, or home resale fees. See, e.g., 3 JOYCE PALOMAR, PATTON AND 
PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES § 609.50 (3d ed.), Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2015). 
Though there are potential differences between these various terms, which I will discuss 
in greater length below, see infra notes 10, 16, and accompanying text, these terms 
collectively summarize the type of covenant I wish to discuss herein, with the important 
proviso that these fees, whatever their designation, are properly described as-and aet 
as-a method of financing improvements to the real property at issue. See PALOMAR, 
supra. 
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against in Part IL The Article concludes that this solution, by working within 
the context of existing notice structures, will minimize any confusion 
associated with recovery fees by maximizing the flow of information and 
eliminating the need for unwarranted and confusing laws and restrictions. 
IL THE MORE THINGS CHANGE 
"Toere is nothing new under the sun."5 Though thi� sentiment may be 
a bit strong as a general statement, it nicely sums up the situation regarding 
recovery fees. While it is true recovery fees are encumbrances that look 
different from traditional covenants, they are covenants nonetheless.6 This 
is so because they serve the same purpose and meet all the elements of 
traditional covenants.7 As such, they are legal and permissible.8 This means 
laws and customs have grown up around them and they are built into our 
real property system. And that means attempts to prohibit or avoid recovery 
fees are likely to prove ineffective or cause more harm than good. This is 
important because a number of states and commentators-not 
understanding that recovery fees are a variation of traditional covenants­
have passed laws seeking to prohibit or restrict them.9 These laws are 
doomed to be mostly ineffective given how widely accepted and utilized 
covenants are. 
A. The Nature of Recovery Fees and Covenants
Recovery fees, as mentioned above, may also be called capital recovery 
fees, reconveyance fees, recovery fees, or home resale fees.10 Though these 
terms might feasibly conjure up a variety of different types of fees, they are 
used interchangeably in this context because they all involve: (1) a covenant­
based fee that is triggered by a sale or transfer of real property and (2) money 
flowing from that fee to the original builder or developer of the real property 
at issue.11 
5. Ecc/esiastes l:9.
6. See PALOMAR, supra note 4.
7. See id. (noting transfer fees are covenants).
8. In this Article, my commentary will be directed to the common law, unless a
specific state or statute is identified. 
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See Amy Kathleen Lewis, Comment, Developing Disaster: How Developers Are
Using a Covenant to Stea/ from Homeowners and Why the States Should Stop Them, 64 
OKLA. L. REV. 377, 382 (2012) ("Under any name, the fundamental idea is that a 
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A typical transfer fee covenant provides that successive purehasers must 
pay a percent of any future sale price for the property to the party who 
originally imposed the covenant, and that said covenant will run with 
the land .... Most often, the party originally imposing the covenant is 
the developer of a residential subdivision.12 
485 
covenant is recorded in the chain of title, the servitude attaches to the land for ninety­
nine years, and the burden runs with the land to bind future owners." (citing Marjorie 
Ramseyer Bardwell & James Geoffrey Durham, Transfer Fee Rights: Is the Lure of 
Sharing in Future Appreciation a Flawed Concept?, PR0B. & PROP., May-June 2007, at 
24, 25)). 
12. P AL0MAR, supra note 4. An added element of capitalism is also often present:
"Many transfer fee covenants also require payment of a percent of each sale price to the 
company that 'licensed' the use of its standard form covenants, and another percent to a 
broker." Id. (citing Bardwell & Durham, supra note 11); see also Lewis, supra note 11, 
at 383 ("Before a sale takes place, a broker approaches an initial seller regarding the use 
of a transfer fee covenant to give a covenantor the future share, or earnings of the 
property. Tue broker then collects an initial commission and also may get a share in 
future earnings of the transfer fee covenant [in much the same manner as the initial seller 
and the licensor] .... " (footnote omitted) (citing Bardwell & Durham, supra note 11)). 
Complicating matters even further, the initial seller ( or the licensor or anyone else 
receiving a stream of future income) can sell his or her rights to anyone else for a lump 
sum representing the parties' estimate of the net present value of those future payments. 
Lewis, supra note 11, at 383. This is an odd wrinkle for a couple of reasons. One reason 
is that most people simply do not think of something like a covenant-based fee as 
intellectual property that is subject to being licensed and generating revenues. Cf Robert 
King, Comment, Only in America: Tax Patents and the New Sale of Indulgences, 60 TAX 
LAW. 761, 763 (2007) ("As early as 1908, the courts have been reluctant to extend patent 
protection to methods of doing business."). For most of the history of this country, 
patenting a business method or process was not generally permitted. E.g., id. However, 
most of us are generally comfortable with the idea of gaining rights or a property in te rest 
in a "machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." See id. (citing Hotel Sec. 
Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1908)). But the idea of gaining 
such rights in a business method or a way of conducting business seems abnormal or even 
slightly nefarious. Id. ("Advice is not patentable." (quoting Hotel Sec. Checking Co., 160 
F. at 469)); see also Andrew Beckerman-Rodau et al., eBay v. MercExchange and
Quanta Computer v. LG Electronics, 4 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 5, 29 (2009) ( discussing "the
suspect validity of business method patents"). Another reason this seems strange is that,
as discussed above, this method often involves a property developer selling its rights to
the stream of future payments and thus realizing a large and immediate gain. See Lewis,
supra note 11, at 383. Neither of these issues is ultimately of particular import. It is true
that some have attempted to patent the concept and application of recovery fees. See,
e.g., U.S. Patent Application Pub. No. U S  2010/0042528 Al, at [57] (published Feb. 18,
2010) (publishing U.S. Patent Application No. 12/583,122 (filed Aug. 14, 2009))
(describing a patent application for a "method and system for financing and
reimbursement of infrastructure and improvements to real property," which "results in
486 Drake Law Review [Vol. 65 
The covenant, then, is the central element in this scheme, and if the fee is 
not paid, a lien attaches against the land so encumbered.13 
These fees, then, are recurring and potentially long-lasting.14 Often left 
unsaid, however, is the purpose behind them.15 As the reader may recall, one 
of the terms used to describe this kind of fee is "capital recovery fee. "16 This 
is, indeed, a central feature.17 These kinds of fees are inherently intended to 
the reimbursement of certain costs of infrastructure and improvements made to the 
land"). Admittedly, this relatively novel business approach shades the entire idea of 
recovery fees with a patina of "strangeness," which probably makes academics and 
legislators more suspicious and more willing to criticize or seek to prohibit them. 
Nevertheless, these kinds of method patents are now a more or less accepted element of 
intellectual property law. See King, supra, at 764-65. A third reason is that the transfer 
or sale of these payments is not relevant insofar as the purpose and intent underlying the 
transfer and concomitant realization of money is tied to the improvement or 
development of the real property at issue, which seems an economically justifiable 
assumption, assuming proper notice is provided. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying 
text. Ultimately, then, whether the recovery fee scheme at issue is patented, and whether 
any resultant fee stream is later sold or transferred, is irrelevant. This Article focuses­
as the very question of whether recovery fees are permissible should focus-on the 
nature of the fees and covenants themselves, not on whether they have been patented or 
sold. 
13. PALOMAR, supra note 4. Tue potential for encumbrance is not, in and of itself,
dangerous or disruptive. Encumbrances on title are common and even healthy. Almost 
every commercially originated purehase money loan involves the lender placing a 
mortgage against the property, and there are all manner of encumbrances that do not 
disturb "normal" use, including, of course, covenants. See P ALOMAR, supra note 4, 
§§ 567, 609, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2016). The danger arises, instead, from an
encumbrance that is unanticipated or a surprise. See, e.g., Chad J. Pomeroy, Ending
Surprise Liens on Real Property, 11 NEV. L.J. 139, 145-48 (2010) [hereinafter Pomeroy,
Ending Surprise Liens]; see also Lewis, supra note 11, at 377 (introducing the topic of
recovery fees in a scenario that implies home buyers will be unaware of the recovery
fees).
14. See PALOMAR,supra note 4 (noting transfer fee covenants run with the land for
99 years). 
15. See Lewis, supra note 11, at 380-83 ( discussing the formation of these fees with
the only stated purpose being profits). 
16. P ALOMAR, supra note 4.
17. See, e.g., FREEHOLD CAP. PARTNERS, www.freeholdcapitalpartners.com (last
visited Feb. 9, 2017). Freehold Capital Partners is one of the purveyors of the recovery 
fee approach, approaching developers and attempting to license their particular method. 
Id. A review of their site reveals quite clearly that their fees are meant to be tied directly 
to the improvement of the property. See Developers, FREEHOLD CAP. PARTNERS, 
http://freeholdcapitalpartners.com/developers/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2017); see also 
Freehold Capital Partners Announces $71,910,000.00 Alabama Project, THESTREET 
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permit developers to finance the ( often substantial) costs associated with 
real estate development in a manner that spreads the expense over a long 
period of time.18 
This is not an entirely new idea. Homeowners' associations routinely 
assess fees to homeowners to pay for ongoing maintenance.19 Indeed, much 
of the purpose behind the modem concept of covenants and owners' 
associations is to permit neighbors to share in the common expenses of the 
development.20 And this is not limited to repairs. Capital improvements and 
expansion can also be addressed in this manner. It is entirely within 
acceptable norms, for instance, for a homeowners' association to assess fees 
( either ongoing or special) and to utilize those funds to build an 
improvement in the relevant neighborhood.21 This should sound familiar 
because it is precisely what a recovery fee does. The only difference is the 
timing. With recovery fees, the developer is recouping fees for development 
(May 25, 2010), https://www.thestreet.com/story/10766366/1/freehold-capital-partners­
announces-7191000000-alabama-project.html ("By working with Freehold to structure a 
one percent Capital Recovery Fee, the project owner can more fairly apportion costs 
and, in consequence, lower the sales price. Since a portion of the significant capital 
investment in the project can be recovered over time, current and future buyers will 
enjoy lower acquisition costs, which means lower closing costs and lower monthly 
interest payments. In this way a Capital Recovery Fee is distinguishable from a 
govemment transfer fee (i.e. a tax that rai.ses property costs for everyone as a means of 
funding government services) . . .. [B]y creating a Capital Recovery Fee and segregating 
the income stream out from the project ... the project owner has the potential to bring 
additional liquidity to the project. This, in turn, can restart stalled projects, create jobs, 
pay down bank loans, and create a ripple effect throughout the economy." ( emphasis 
ornitted)). This Article is focused on these types of fees: fees that are directly tied to 
improvements to real property. Of course, it is more than conceivable that these fees 
could-even if ostensibly tied to improvements-be unduly expanded into a source of 
extra income or revenue. This would be accomplished simply by imposing them in an 
amount sufficient to ensure that the future stream of payments exceeds the current cost 
of improvements. I have little doubt that this could happen, and I rather suspect that the 
academic and legislative hostility engendered by these fees is due to this suspicion or 
concem. See infra Part II.B. However, this concem is not ultimately troublesome, for the 
reasons discussed below. See discussion infra Part II.B. Therefore, we are left focusing 
on fees that can be accurately described as aimed at "capital recovery." See supra note 
4. 
18. FREEHOLD CAP. PARTNERS, supra note 17.
19. See, e.g., Jeffrey E. Stake, Toward an Economic Understanding of Touch and
Concem, 1988 DUKE L.J. 925, 963 n.146 (noting numerous cases in which covenants to 
pay fees are explicitly held to run with the land). 
20. Id. at 962.
21. Id.
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costs, whereas with traditional homeowner assessments, the association is 
pre-funding development costs.22 
Given such a provenance, I think the question is the relatively 
straightforward one of whether these sorts of fees can satisfy the traditional 
requirements of covenants running with the land. A covenant is a prornise 
that is intended to stick to--or "run with"-the land.23 This represents a 
combination of property law and contract law and is not terribly intuitive.24
The basic idea is that parties to a sale or transfer of land should be able to 
make a promise that affects land and runs to (and thereby binds) future 
owners.25 
22. Note, however, that even this distinction may break down, if the developer is
able to sell its right to future fees. See, e.g., in fra notes 42-46 and accompanying text. If 
that occurs, then, in a sense, the homeowners are merely being asked to pay for 
improvements. 
23. Lewis, supra note 11.
24. See W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Comment Note.-Affirmative Covenants as
Running with the Land, 68 A.L.R.2d 1022, § 2 (1959), Westlaw. 
25. For example, assume that Calvin owns a large farm. He desires to retire, so he
puts up most of his property for sale, seeking to keep a small parcel to himself to live on 
in retirement. Now, Calvin wants to sell the majority of his property, but he still wants 
to live in a pastoral setting, so he is not willing to sell to just anyone. As such, when Henry 
makes an offer to buy the marketed property from Calvin, Calvin makes Henry (as part 
of the purehase agreement) promise not to build something that is not agricultural in 
nature (like a strip mall or an apartment complex). This promise is a benefit to Calvin 
(who gets to prevent Henry from building nonagricultural property) and a burden to 
Henry (who is prevented from building certain types of structures). Of course, assuming 
Henry receives an adequate discount on the purehase, this arrangement suits both 
parties just fine. It is, however, a purely contractual arrangement; so Calvin can have 
little confidence that his pastoral bliss will continue. As soon as Henry sells the property 
to some third party (let us say someone named Audrey), then Audrey (as a stranger to 
the contract) would be free to develop the property in whatever way she wanted, thus 
frustrating Calvin's desire (for which he theoretically paid fair value by way of 
discounting the price of his farm). Likewise, if Calvin were to sell the retained homestead 
(let us say to someone named Sophie), then Henry could build anything he wanted 
without fear of suit because Sophie (as a stranger to the contract) would be unable to 
enforce the promise. This is obviously problematic, as real property is immovable and 
the value of the property is the contemplation of its future use and the ability to rely 
thereon. See ROBERT G. NATELSON, MODERN LAW OF DEEDS TO REAL PROPERTY 5, 
350 (1992) (noting land is immovable and may be difficult to sell due to actions of 
neighbors ). Because of this, and because of the large financial investment often involved, 
landowners pushed for the creation of covenants. See id. at 5, 350-51; see also 
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 3, at 892 ("Thwarted by the law courts' refusal to 
recognize new types of negative easements, landowners turned-in the early nineteenth 
century-to the law of contracts. They· sought judicial recognition of a contract right 
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But there a number of specific requirements that must be met for a 
covenant to run with the land.26 First, there must be privity of estate.27 More 
specifically, U.S. courts have held horizontal and vertical privity are required 
for the burden of a covenant to run at law to successors, and vertical privity 
must exist for the benefit of a covenant to so run.28 If this sounds confusing 
and complicated, that is only because it is. I think it sufficient for our 
purposes to indicate broadly that covenants have traditionally satisfied this 
multifaceted privity requirement when: (1) the original parties to the 
promise have a grantor-grantee relationship and (2) subsequent landowners 
succeed to the original parties' ( or their successors') estate.29 
respecting land use enforceable not only against the promisor landowner, but against his 
successors in title as well."). These covenants, or promises, run with the land and thereby 
avoid the problems that might arise, as described above, due the transient nature of both 
ownership and contractual obligation. See NATELSON, supra, at 5, 350-51. These 
covenants are in effect a type of property right, as opposed to a "mere contract right," 
and their recognition allows "the market to allocate conflicting land uses efficiently." 
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 3, at 893. 
26. Tue requirements set forth herein refer to the traditionally recognized
requirements associated with covenants, which arose as covenants evolved from contract 
rights and duties. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 3, at 893-94. This evolution began in 
the eariy nineteenth century and is largely reflected in the first Restatement of Property. 
See id. at 893, 895-96 (citing RESTATEMENT OFPROP. § 534 (AM. LAWINST. 1944)). This 
view, since the publication of the Restatement (First), has been criticized as technical 
and archaic, with the Restatement (Third) repudiating some requirements. Id. at 896. 
Nevertheless, the traditional requirements set forth in the Restatement (First) are what 
most law students leam, are still widely required, and, as such, will be the focus of this 
discussion. Note as well, that the requirements of covenants are encompassing of and 
slightly broader than those of equitable servitudes, serving to further underscore the 
suitability of generally focusing on covenants. Id. at 909. 
27. See id. at 893 .. Tois requirement arose directly out of the English common law
exception to the rule of non-assignability of contract rights, which perrnitted the 
assignability of landlord-tenant leasehold covenants where there was privity of estate 
between a landlord and a tenant. See id. at 893-94. In other words, the covenants 
contained in the lease were "enforceable by and against a successor landlord or a 
successor tenant." Id. at 893. This served as the evolutionary jumping-off point for a 
wider range of covenants to "run with the land." See discussion supra note 25. 
28. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 3, at 893-97.
29. See id. Tue concept of horizontal privity grew out of the English focus on the
landlord-tenant relationship and so focuses on the connection between the originally 
promising parties. If they have a grantor-grantee relationship (for example, that of a 
landlord granting a leasehold interest to a grantee ), then the burden (for example, that 
of a tenant promising to maintain common areas) will run to later grantees (for example, 
a sublessee ). See id. at 895. This is not required, however, on the benefit side. This makes 
sense, perhaps, if one again remembers England's landlord-tenant monomania and 
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Second, the parties must intend the promise to run.30 This is a 
straightforward requirement that requires little elaboration. 
Third, a similarly clear-cut requirement is that any subsequent 
purehaser (to be bound by the covenant) must have actual or constructive 
notice.31 
Fourth and finally, a covenant must "touch and concem" the land.32 
This is a fairly imprecise requirement. The general idea is that only 
"covenants whose content relates to land use or enjoyment" in a direct and 
specific way should "attach" to the land and thereby bind those who come 
later.33 But just what sort of covenants have that sort of relationship to land 
thinks of this in terms of permitting a landlord to assign the rights to a lease easily and 
with few requirements (likely not upsetting any tenant expectations and furthering the 
economic benefit associated with the easy marketability of commercial property). As to 
the benefit side, vertical privity is required because "the burden and the benefit run with 
estates in land, not with the land itself. [As such,] · ... a covenant is enforceable at law by 
and against remote parties only if those parties have succeeded to the original parties' 
estates in the land in question." Id. at 897. Even this is (perhaps unbelievably) somewhat 
sirnplified, as the requirements and definition of vertical privity vary depending on 
whether the focus is on the burden or the benefit. Id. ("On the burden side, the covenant 
is enforceable only against someone who has succeeded to the same estate as that of the 
original promisor .... A more relaxed standard is used for the running of the benefit .... 
[And such a] promise is enforceable by a person who succeeds to the original promisee's 
estate or a lesser interest carved out of that estate. "). Importantly, in the modem context, 
the privity element does exist even when the party seeking to enforce the covenant is a 
homeowners' association. See, e.g., id. at 919 ("Today it is well settled that homeowner 
associations do have standing to enforce development covenants, both in law and equity, 
if they have been given enforcement power . . . . Tue basis for standing is the 
homeowners' association's status as a third-party beneficiary." (citations omitted)). This 
means that privity, which would traditionally seem to disqualify homeowners' 
associations from enforcing a covenant, is not actually a barrier. See id. 
30. Id. at 901.
31. Id. In faet, the requirement is a little bit broader than "notice " irnplies-only a
bona fide purehaser (that is, someone who purehases for consideration) will escape the 
effect of a covenant due to lack of notice. See id. at 907. "N otice, " in the property context, 
often (though not always) irnplies a party who both pays value and has no notice. See id. 
This is because, "A fundamental principle of the recording system is that only 
subsequent purehasers, and not donees, are protected against prior interests of which 
they have no notice." Id. at 901 n.34. 
32. Id. at 901.
3 3. See id. at 917. Though maybe not terribly intuitive, this makes sense. Assume
that Audrey sells Blackacre to Henry and that Audrey continues to occupy Whiteacre, 
the neighboring property. Now assume that Henry promises to wash Audrey's car once 
a month in connection with that sale. That is, of course, wonderful for Audrey. However, 
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has been subject to much discussion and dispute.34 Initially, courts often held 
that only negative covenants qualified.35 That is no longer the case, though, 
as affirmative covenants are routinely enforced.36 As of now, the "touch and 
concem" requirement is still somewhat vague and has been the object of 
much debate, but it is fair to say a reasonable working definition is a promise 
that directly affects the nature or use of the property that is burdened.37 
what happens if Henry sells Blackacre to Sophie? Should Sophie thereafter have to wash 
Audrey's car? Tue common sense response is that she should not-because that was an 
agreement between Audrey and Henry, and it has nothing to do with Sophie (regardless 
of whether Audrey and Henry wanted Henry's successors in interest to be so bound). 
However, what if Henry, instead of promising to wash Audrey's car, instead promised 
that he would never install a car wash on Blackacre? The parallel question to the above 
hypothetical is what happens when Henry sells Blackacre to Sophie: Should Sophie be 
bound by this promise? Here, the common sense response is probably yes-because the 
promise is inherently focused on the property, not on the performing ( or receiving) party 
because the promise "touches and concems" the land. 
34. See id.
35. Id. This is likely due to the faet that covenants largely evolved due to the law's
limited adoption and promulgation of negative easements. "A negative easement is the 
right of the dominant owner to stop the servient owner from doing something on the 
servient land." Id. at 887. This is, of course, precisely what a negative covenant does, and 
negative easements (which are interests owned by the benefited party, or parcel, and so 
can be said to "run with the land") have been around for much longer than legal 
covenants. See id. (noting negative easements were recognized prior to Queen Victoria's 
reign). However, negative easements were historically limited to four specific types of 
prohibitions on neighborly activity: (1) blocking windows, (2) interfering with air flow, 
(3) removing support of artificial structures, and (4) interfering with water flowing in an
artificial stream. Id. Because the ability to negatively restrict one's neighbor was limited
to these four activities, landowners cast about for additional tools to address other
activities-and eventually settled upon negative covenants. See id. at 889 ("Restatement
(Third) of Property . . .  treats negative easements as restrictive covenants. ").
36. Id. at 917-18. Courts were traditionally hesitant to enforce affirmative
covenants because doing so raises the specter of continuing judicial supervision, because 
such covenants have often been viewed as clogs on title, and because of the potential for 
significant liability. Id. These days, however, most affirmative covenants relate to the 
payment of dues to an association that has some responsibility for, or relationship with, 
the property at issue, and courts nearly always enforce these type of obligations. Id. at 
918. 
37. See, e.g., Marcy Allen, Note, A Touchy Subject: Has the Restatement Replaced
the Touch and Concem Doctrine with an Equally Troublesome Test?, 65 BA YLOR L. REV.
1034, 1036 (2013) ("The touch and concem doctrine is substance-based: there is no one 
concrete definition, but the inquiry is whether the promise impacts the land itself rather 
than being solely a personal promise between parties."); see also, e.g., Stake, supra note 
19 (noting numerous cases in which covenants to pay fees are explicitly held to run with 
the land). 
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Recovery fees meet these four elements. The second and third 
elements are clear: the parties involved intend the promises to run with the 
land, and notice is provided so long as the recovery f ees are properly 
recorded. 38 
The other two elements (touch and concem, and privity) also exist in 
connection with recovery fees, though not as clearly. Indeed, these two 
elements may initially appear fairly problematic because the fee is paid by 
the homeowner to someone or something other than the developer or a 
homeowners' association.39 After all, a payment to a detached third party 
who is not investing in, or tending to, property certainly seems isolated from 
the property, and involves an individual who is not in traditional privity with 
either the benefited or the burdened party. This resuscitated objection is 
rather easily disposed of though. As discussed above, the concept of paying 
covenant-based fees to any homeowners' association is conceptually 
problematic in a traditional sense, and the payment of fees was similarly 
tricky.40 However, those concems have now been laid to rest, as the modem 
law has put reality over form, and has held both that money paid toward the 
upkeep of real property does touch and concem that property and that 
homeowners' associations are legal agents of the true party in privity.41 
The same logic applies here, albeit in a situation where the parties are 
a further step removed from each other. As to the touch and concem 
38. Toere are two ways to be put on notice of another's interest in, or claim to, land:
actual notice and constructive notice. l PALOMAR, supra note 4, § 12, Westlaw (database 
updated Nov. 2016). Actual notice is just what it sounds like: actual knowledge of the 
interest (because the relevant party is told, she or he found out directly, or through any 
other direct reason). Id. Constructive notice arises in two ways: through inquiry notice 
or record notice. Id. Inquiry notice describes a situation where a reasonable person in 
the relevant person's position would have known of the claim or interest. Id. A classic 
example is a home that bears outward signs of being occupied by someone other than 
the seller; any reasonable buyer, the argument goes, should know (or suspect) that 
someone else is living in the house and, so, has some claim to it. Record notice is statutory 
in nature. Every state has a statute providing that everyone (all potentially interested 
parties) are put on notice of claims or interests that are properly recorded (generally in 
the appropriate county recorder's office). See id. This is, by far, the most important kind 
of notice and is certainly the way that most third parties would be put on notice of 
recovery fees; though this Articlt: does suggest a slight addition to the statutory canon in 
order to make such notice more helpful, with respect to recovery fees. See infra Part III. 
39. Recall that this payment to a person or entity entirely unknown to the original
party is a common circumstance associated with recovery fees. See supra note 18. 
40. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
41. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 3, at 918.
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requirement, recovery fees are intrinsically tied to the sums that are 
expended to develop and care for the real property.42 It is true the 
chronology of payment and expenditure is seemingly asynchronous, in that 
the developer expends the funds early on and receives payments over time.43 
However, this matters not at all. Money is fungible, and the reason the 
developer is able or willing to spend money is that the developer can count 
on fees accumulatirig over time. Indeed, the irrelevancy of this concem­
due to the interchangeability of money over time-is heightened when the 
developer, rather than receiving the fees over time, sells that right to another 
(either directly or via a licensing arrangement) in exchange for immediate 
payment, representing the present value of the future stream of payments, 
which the developer then invests in the real property at issue.44 In such a 
situation, it is abundantly clear that the stream of payments is, in faet, 
directly flowing into the real property in precisely the same way as 
homeowners' association fees that go toward maintaining improvements, 
and therefore, the payments touch and concem the land. One possible 
objection to this line of thinking may be that such an argument suffices so 
long as the developer does not overcharge in fees and thus receive an excess 
over the investment put into the property.45 This objection, however, is an 
inherently patronizing one, taking for granted that the buyers at issue (the 
burdened parties) are unable to assess value and, as such, their estimation of 
value-encompassed as it necessarily is in the final contract price-should 
be discarded.46 Moreover, any concem in that area should theoretically be 
resolved by clear information provided to prospective buyers, as is suggested 
below.47 
Having concluded that these fees do, indeed, connect to the property­
thus, touching and conceming it-the privity issue also resolves. Of course, 
42. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
43. See FREEHOLD CAP. PARTNERS, supra note 17.
44. See Lewis, supra note 11, at 383.
45. See id. at 404.
46. Assuming that all parties are properly informed, it is difficult to see why the
law---either legislatively or judicially-should presurne that property purehasers are 
unable to appropriately value the work that recovery fees are paying for. This is a clear 
manifestation of basic economics and the concept ( albeit not universally adopted or 
accepted) that well-informed markets reach efficient outcomes. See, e.g., Wentong 
Zheng, The Pitfalls of the (Perfect) Market Benchmark: The Case of Countervailing Duty 
Law, 19 MINN. J. INT'L L. 1, 52 (2010) ("Markets, it is said, provide a measure of 
maximum econornic efficiency."). 
47. See infra Part III.
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if it is the developer itself that receives the fees, then there is clearly privity 
( even more so than in the case of an intervening homeowners' association). 
And even if the recipient of the fees is not the developer, it is, ineluctably, a 
person who or entity that is receiving them through a direct connection with 
the developer that imposed them for the benefit of the property and, 
therefore, the recipient is as much a third-party beneficiary as is the 
homeowners' association.48 
Accordingly, recovery fees are merely a new kind of covenant.49 Thus, 
there should not be significant worry or concem regarding them and states 
should not overreact to them. Of course, that faet never stops legislatures.50 
B. Kicking Against the Pricks
Thinking-mistakenly-that recovery fees are new or scary or some 
other kind of evil, a number of legislatures have attempted to counteract 
48. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 3, at 896-97.
49. It is only fair to note that this opinion is not shared by everyone. See Lewis,
supra note 11, at 389-400. Amy Lewis is against recovery fees and believes that they fail 
almost every conceivable element required of covenants. She argues that they do not 
touch and concern the land because they are "purely financial" and are not "associated 
with rent or homeowners' associations." Id. at 397. As discussed above, this is certainly 
an understandable view. Also as discussed above, however, it is a fairly shallow one. To 
say that recovery fees are purely financial and do not relate to the land is to ignore their 
explicit tie to the improvements that underlay their existence. Certainly, one could argue 
that the fees are too high or otherwise unreasonable, see id. at 404, but that simply does 
not divorce them from the improvements they serve to finance ( even if the chronology 
of repayment is not standard). Similarly, Ms. Lewis argues that recovery fees do not 
satisfy the privity requirement. See id. at 398. She walks through four different views of 
privity and argues that recovery fees generally fail to meet the requirements because the 
fees are generally paid to a third party. See id. at 398-400. Firstly, this argument presumes 
that the promise necessarily runs to a third party. Id. at 398. This presumption is 
erroneous as· recovery fees often flow, under the terms of the underlying covenant, to 
the original owner (likely, a developer) who may later transfer those rights to a third 
party. Moreover, even if the fee did run directly to a third party, this would satisfy the 
modem conception of privity because the ultimate recipient is merely acting as the agent, 
or some sort of beneficiary, of a promise made between the original parties to the 
transaction and transfer. See, e.g., Neponsit Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. 
Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793, 797 (N.Y. 1938) (developing a theory of privity by representation). 
Lewis then goes on to argue, eloquently, about policy and the balancing of the burdens 
and benefits of recovery fees (as she sees them). See Lewis, supra note 11, 400-06. 
Ultimately, I think these arguments, while interesting, are not persuasive as recovery 
fees fall within the traditional orbit of covenant law and so should be governed thereby. 
50. In 2012, 18 states had restricted transfer fee covenants in some form. Lewis,
supra note 11, at 406 ( citations omitted). 
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them.51 Nearly half the states have adopted some sort of provision 
prohibiting or governing recovery fees.52 
Unfortunately, these restrictions are unlikely to have their intended 
effect, given the difficulty of isolating and defining the "undesirable" 
restrictions and the creativity and ingenuity of those who seek them. Take 
Utah's statute, for example: it creates two classes of transfer fees.53 The first 
class is labeled a "reinvestment fee covenant"; is defined as a restriction that 
"obligates a future buyer or seller . . . to pay to a common interest 
association, upon and as a result of a transfer of the real property, a fee that 
is dedicated to benefitting the burdened property"; and restricts these fees 
by prohibiting their sale, assignment, or conveyance.54 The second class is 
labeled a "transfer fee covenant"; is defined as an obligation "that is imposed 
on a future buyer or seller of real property, other than a person who is a 
party to the covenant ... [ which requires said party] to pay a fee upon and 
as a result of a transfer of the real property"; and is declared "void and 
unenforceable. "55 
This seems a reasonable and relatively straightforward attempt to 
restrict recovery fees. However, there are easy ways to avoid these statutory 
constraints. Rather than directly transferring or selling the reinvestment fee 
covenant, for example, a recipient could "license" it or direct its income into 
a jointly held venture with a "partner," or come up with many other methods 
51. Further cementing the Author's belief that the worst phrase in the English
language is, "Toere ought to be a law!" 
52. Lewis, supra note 11, at 407. Tue states banning recovery fees include Arizona,
Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Oregon, and Utah. Id. (citations ornitted). 
Tue states otherwise restricting recovery fees include Arizona, Califomia, Delaware, 
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, and Utah. Id. (citations ornitted). Note, 
however, that the Texas ban has since been repealed. Aet of June 17, 2011, ch. 211, sec. 
2, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 780, 784 (repealing TEx. PROP. CODE ANN.§ 5.017 (West 2010)). 
Most of these states focused on the public policy of the marketability of real property, 
indicating that transfer fees directly undercut this policy. See Lewis, supra note 11, at 
407. Indeed, North Carolina went as far as to codify the punishments for those who
attempted to attach transfer fees to their developments, stating that those developers
would be responsible for all court fees, attomeys' costs, and any other costs caused by
litigating the transfer fees. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 39A-3 (West 2017).
53. Id.
54. Id. § 57-1-46(1)(i)(ii), (3)(a).
55. Id. § 57-1-46(1)(j)(B), (l)(j)(C), (2) (noting that such covenants "recorded on
or after March 16, 2010" are "void and unenforceable"). 
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of directing ( or "siphoning," if you prefer) the proceeds elsewhere.56 
Similarly, rather than creating a transfer fee covenant that is triggered by a 
sale or transfer, a developer could build in a recurring fee that is tied to an 
event other than sale or transfer, for example, a fee that is suspended due to 
an inactive market in the development area.57 
Such creativity used to get around restrictive statutes is accessible and 
plausible because of how mainstream these fees are. Though recovery fees 
seem new, strange, or even predatory, they .are merely a refashioning of a 
traditional homeowners' covenant meant to protect property values by way 
of payment. Given that, it is easy to thjnk of many ways in which this concept 
can be executed. 
III. THE DANGER OF RECOVERY FEES58 
Recovery fees simply are not startlingly dangerous because they are 
merely a type of covenant, and the general concept of a covenant has been 
around for so long.59 This means· that people are accustomed to them and 
can understand and react to them appropriately.60 This is important because 
conveying understanding to an interested party is a key element of property, 
and one which cannot happen with respect to novel or unknown types of 
interests.61 So long as interests are understood, the U.S. recording system 
56. See Lewis, supra note 11, at 383.
57. These are not necessarily the most creative workarounds. There are probably
other, better ideas, and it is certainly possible that a Utah court could read the statute 
broadly enough to restrict these kinds of activities. The broader point stands though, and 
I maintain that no statute is perfect and likely to entirely restrict fees or a developer's 
ability to profit from a well-drafted, thoughtful covenant. 
58. Much of this Part is drawn from two of the Author's previous articles: Pomeroy,
Ending Surprise Liens, supra note 13, and Chad J. Pomeroy, The Shape of Property, 44 
SETON HALL L. REV. 797, 807-19 (2014) [hereinafter Pomeroy, Shape of Property]. 
These articles are the primary sources for this Part, both conceptually and through 
verbatim quotations of text and footnotes found in these articles. Throughout this Part, 
footnotes located within block quotations are the footnotes originally found in the text 
quoted in the above articles, with slight changes to comply with current citation 
requirements. Attribution to the original article source will be found at the end of the 
quotation. 
59. See Pomeroy, Ending Surprise Liens, supra note 13, at 146 ( discussing the trend
of recording statutes, started in 1640, which provided notice for the public of interests in 
property). 
60. See id. at 146 n.43, 147 (discussing the effect of and advantages of recording
systems). 
61. Pomeroy, Shape of Property, supra note 58, at 808.
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provides adequate notice and information.62 This system, discussed below, 
effectively ensures that people are not surprised by others' claims to title or 
right of encumbrance. 
Tue only catch is that the system only works so long as the claims and 
rights at issue are widely understood.63 Recovery fees-though not entirely 
new-probably do .not qualify as being widely understood. This is because 
they constitute a variation on an old theme, which creates enough novelty 
and surprise to upend property's informational role.64 Accordingly, these 
interests do present some dangers that legislators and academics would do 
well to consider. 
A. Information and Recording in the United States
Covenants generally fit in nicely with the way the U.S. property law 
system currently operates, given the manner in which property rights 
function. Property is in rem (as opposed to in personam).65 This means that 
property rights-that is, the entitlements of a particular owner of property­
are defined in the context of the property owned, as opposed to being 
defined in the context of the owner of the property.66 Accordingly, items of 
property must themselves effectively communicate an owner's rights and 
obligations to the world at large, as fixed rights flow from the property 
regardless of who owns it or what claims those owners make.67 
62. Pomeroy, Ending Surprise Liens, supra note 13, at 148.
63. Pomeroy, Shape of Property, supra note 58, at 808.
64. See id. at 808-09.
65. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law
and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 359 (2001) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, What 
Happened]. 
66. This conflicts with the view of property rights as a "bundle of rights." Compare
JEREMY BENTHAM, THE LIMITS OF JURISPRUDENCE DEFINED 164 (Charles Warren 
Everett ed., Greenwood Press 1970) (1789), and ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON 
JURISPRUDENCE 10 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., 1978), with Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on 
Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357,370 (1954) (characterizing property instead as 
an "exclusive right to control an economic good"). 
67. See Merrill & Smith, What Happened, supra note 65.
In order to avoid violating another's property rights, [individuals] must ascertain 
what those rights are. In order to acquire property rights, [individuals] must 
measure various attributes, ranging from the physical boundaries of a parcel, to 
use rights, to the attendant liabilities of the owner to others (such as adjacent 
owners). 
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: 
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This is generally easy to accomplish if the interests at issue are well­
known and if there is an efficient mechanism to communicate these interests. 
We will comeback to the first of those two requirements momentarily. Tue 
second, however, is easily met because, in the United States, recording acts 
permit interested parties to assess and analyze potentially competing 
interests68 in real property.69 This happens as a result of the statutory schema 
inherent in the acts and as a result of tradition and common knowledge. 
The statutory schema rests upon written, public notice. 
The concept of recording written documents, tentatively begun in 
England, started to gain widespread acceptance and usage by colonial 
times.7° America was founded at a time when the importance of land 
was shifting from its historical role of a font of family wealth and status 
to its modem role as a commodity to be bought and sold .... 71 This was 
particularly true in the new world, which was not bound by the 
contemporary mores and aristocratic values still prevalent in the old 
world.72 • • • •  
[As this shift accelerated,] [i]ndividuals and entities increasingly 
required an efficient and reliable method to review prior conveyances. 
The fitful writing and notice requirements then available did not suffice, 
[as] few owners possessed a complete record of prior conveyances.73 
Even those who did could not be trusted to produce [ a full list of 
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Y ALE L.J. 1, 26 (2000) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, 
Optimal Standardization]. 
68. lnterest is meant broadly and includes both claims of ownership and claims of
control. 
69. Pomeroy, Ending Surprise Liens, supra note 13, at 182 (noting recording acts
"require all parties to put the public on notice of their claimed interests"). 
70. Even prior to the Norman Conquest, there was a system of voluntary
registration of land deeds overseen by local monasteries. John Hanna, The Extension af 
Public Recordation, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 617, 619-20 (1931). Recording, though, was not 
strictly mandatory, and there was no uniformity. See id. at 619-20. 
71. Arthur R. Gaudio, Electronic Real Estate Records: A Model for Action, 24 W.
NEW ENG. L. REv. 271, 272 (2002). This shift was only heightened by the widespread 
advent of mortgage liens, a direct outgrowth of the new view of land as a resource to be 
utilized commercially. Id. 
72. Tue first known recordation in the United States occurred in 1627 at Plymouth
Colony. Ray E. Sweat, Race, Race-Notice and Notice Statutes: The American Recording 
System, PROB. & PROP., May/June 1989, at 27, 27. 
73. Gaudio, supra note 71.
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relevant claims ].74 
It is in this context that colonial legislatures began to establish the 
first "American" land recording systems.75 In 1640, the General Court 
of the Massachusetts Bay Colony adopted the first modem recording 
aet. Tue aet stated that an unrecorded instrument was good as between 
the parties even [if] not recorded, but required [the instrument] to be 
recorded within a specific amount of time to be good against unknowing 
third parties.76 A full recitation of all relevant facts was not required, 
and only the essential elements of the conveyance (such as the name of 
the grantor and grantee, a description of the property and estate 
granted, and the date of transfer) had to be recorded.77 
Though simple in nature, this represented an important change 
from the haphazard English system.78 Public, written notice was no 
longer a matter of local custom or a technicality easily avoided if 
desirable. Under this new system, [one had to put others on notice of a 
conveyance in order to effectively transfer a defensible interest in real 
property]. [This was an important advancement, and it] provided the 
basis for the more sophisticated recording statutes of today.79 
74. Id.
499 
75. See id. This intensified throughout the Industrial Revolution, which created an
"unprecedented demand for credit" that eventually spread from real to personal 
property. See l GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 2.1 
(5th prtg. 2007). 
76. See l RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS
BAY IN NEW ENGLAND, 1628-164 1, at 306 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed., 1853) .... 
77. Sweat, supra note 72, at 27-28.
78. These recording acts, while [supporting the informational nature of property)
by publicly promulgating the type of information needed by third parties, were also likely 
viewed as revenue generating systems, as they effectively operated as a tax on 
conveyances . . . . Indeed, "there is a substantial direct cost associated with the filing 
systems required by the reporting acts ... because many of these systems have filing fees 
and ultimately serve as direct revenue streams for county and other local governments. 
See, e.g., Jonathan C. Lipson, Secrets and Liens: The End of Notice in Commercial 
Finance Law, 2 1  EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 421, 484-85 (2005)." Pomeroy, Ending Surprise 
Liens, supra note 13, at 158 n.1 10. 
79. Initially, a simple paper system whereby the recorder manually copied the
transfer document into the records of the town or county was reasonably workable and 
sufficient to impart the requisite notice .... [A]s time has gone by, [however,] document 
records have multiplied, initially due to the passage of time and concomitant 
accumulation of transfers but increasingly due to the complicated and sophisticated 
nature of real property commerce and finance. See Gaudio, supra note 7 1, at 272-74. 
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Like much of real property law, the rules regarding recording are 
local. Most goveming law is based on state statutes and state-court 
interpretations of these statutes.80 Toere are, however, broad rules 
applicable across alljurisdictions.81 In particular, there are three generic 
types of recording acts, known as "notice," "race-notice," and "race."82 
Under the notice acts, unrecorded conveyances are invalid against 
subsequent transferees without notice; regardless 'of who records first.83 
Under the race-notice acts, the subsequent transferees have priority 
only if they are without notice of the first transferee and they record 
first.84 Finally, under the pure race-type acts, the subsequent transferees 
have priority if they record before the initial transferee, even if aware of 
the earlier conveyance.85 This type of statute creates a "race to the 
courthouse." 
Initially, recording acts were primarily of the race type, but most 
This complexity was initially addressed by the introduction of indices tied first to names 
and later to parcel numbers. See id. at 273. Recently, this complexity has been addressed 
with more efficient copying systems, computer databases, and Internet capabilities. Still, 
the basic goal and function of these systems remain the same: to publicize information 
regarding title to real property [and thus protect the informational requirements of an 
effective real property system]. 
80. Sweat, supra note 72, at 28.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. These statutes generally read as follows: "No conveyance, transfer or mortgage
of real property shall be good and effectual in law or equity against creditors or 
subsequent purehasers for a valuable consideration and without notice, unless the same 
be recorded." Id.
84. These statutes generally read as follows: "Every conveyance of real estate [ that]
shall not be recorded shall be void as against any subsequent purehaser in good faith, 
and for a valuable consideration of the. same real estate or any portion thereof, whose 
conveyance shall be first duly recorded." Id.
85. These statutes generally read as follows: "No conveyance of land ... shall be
valid to pass any property interest as against a purehaser for valuable consideration ... 
but from the time of recording." Id.
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modem recording acts are of the notice type.8687 
Regardless of the type of recording aet adopted, the intent ( and clear 
practical effect) of these statutes is to protect subsequent transferees from 
hidden or unknown claims or interests.88 So long as recovery fees are 
recorded, then all interested parties should have adequate knowledge and 
the informational element of property discussed above should be well 
served.89 
86. Id. . . . Tue different types of statutes may have a different effect on the
subsequent transferees. For example, assume that Allison transfers Blackacre to Audrey 
for valuable consideration on January 1 and then again transfers Blackacre to Sophie for 
valuable consideration on February 1. Neither Audrey nor Sophie records their interest 
upon transfer, and Sophie has no notice of Audrey's in te rest. Under a race(-]type statute, 
if Audrey records first, she will have priority, even if she knows of the subsequent 
transfer to Sophie; likewise, if Sophie records first, she will have priority. Under a notice 
statute, Sophie will have priority, regardless of who records first, because, at the time of 
the transfer to her, Sophie had no notice and Audrey had not recorded. Finally, under a 
race-notice statute, Sophie will have priority only if she records first. 
87. Pomeroy, Ending Surprise Liens, supra note 13, at 145-47.
88. Sweat, supra note 72, at 28.
The effectiveness of recording statutes is further bolstered by bankruptcy 
protections afforded to creditors who properly record. Under the Bankruptcy 
Code, a trustee for a bankrupt debtor has the power to exploit defective filing 
by avoiding flawed transactions. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(l) (2012). lf avoided, 
the relevant property becomes available for distribution to all unsecured 
creditors. This is known as the "strong-arm power" and is borne from a concern 
about surprise liens. By affording a trustee the same rights as a hypothetical 
creditor in a hypothetical proceeding, Congress effectively ensured that the 
bankrupt estate will have the same rights as any other creditor. See REPORT OF 
THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. 
Doc. No. 93-137, pt.1, at 18 (1973). This strong-arm power has only heightened 
the importance of the recording acts to interest holders whose rights are 
potentially voidable. See, e.g., James J. White, Revising Article 9 to Reduce 
Wasteful Litigation, 26 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 823, 830-41 (1993). 
Pomeroy, Ending Surprise Liens, supra note 13, at 147 n.51. On the other hand, recording 
acts do not alleviate all problems associated with conveyances of real property and may, 
in faet, create some problems. See Sweat, supra note 72, at 29-30. For example, though 
creating a uniform requirement for notice of some type, the recording acts do not 
necessarily specify what notice will be effective and what documents will provide that 
notice. As such, there is potential for various transferees, or ostensible transferees, to 
record varying types of documents and to create confusion and ambiguity for potential 
subsequent transferees. See id. 
89. See generally Sweat, supra note 72 (concluding recording acts serve to "reward
knowledge rather than putting a prernium on ignorance"). 
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And that is technically true.90 However, there is often substantial space 
between "technical " and "practical." The reason for this space is that, as 
discussed above, property conveys information and recording acts work well 
when the interests at issue are well-known-when potentially interested 
parties understand the kind of interest that has been recorded and is thus 
being broadcast-and that is not precisely the situation here.91 
B. Imperfect Notice 
Recovery fees are new-to an extent.92 Though they fall within the 
general oeuvre of traditional covenants, they create different consequences 
and are triggered under different circumstances than the kinds of covenants 
people are traditionally accustomed to seeing.93 This novelty effectively 
undermines our notice system because new types of property undercut the 
in rem nature of property.94 They make communication difficult because 
"third parties have to expend time and resources to gain ... knowledge, and 
unusual [or new] property forms increase the cost of doing this."95
According to Merrill and Smith, these informational costs and burdens 
are legitimate drivers of normative analysis, generally, andjudicial behavior, 
specifically.96 More particularly, they claim that marginal informational costs 
of the type discussed above drive courts to apply what Merrill and Smith 
refer to as the numerus clausus.97 This theory seeks to explain why courts 
90. See id. at 28.
91. See Chad J. Pomeroy, Why Is Property So Hard?, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 505,
528-29 (2013) [hereinafter Pomeroy, Why Is Property So Hard?]; supra Part III.A.
92. They are, so to speak, "newish."
93. See supra Part Il.
94. See supra Part 111.A.
95. Pomeroy, Why Is Property So Hard?, supra note 91, at 529. Merrill and Smith,
who have written much on this topic in the context of the sorts of estates that are 
permitted under the law, focus on the costs bome by third parties. See Merrill & Smith, 
Optimal Standardization, supra note 67. They claim that "[p]roperty owners will not 
take ... account of these ... costs because they do not bear them .... " Pomeroy, Why 
Is Property So Hard?, supra note 91, at 529 n.107 (citing Merrill & Smith, Optimal 
Standardization, supra note 67, at 26-27). Accordingly, property "works " only when it is 
simple and standardized enough that all third parties can understand the rights that flow 
from property easily and with little or no cost. Id. 
96. Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 67, at 60.
97. See id. at 4. Merrill and Smith's numerus clausus theory attempts to explain why
property law is uniquely uniform when it comes to the types of estates that courts will 
recognize. See id. at 69; see also Henry E. Smith, Community and Custom in Property, 10 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 5, 35 (2009). Merrill and Smith claim that this is a "stealth 
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limit the forms (or estates) that property can take and posits that they do so 
because, 
limiting new forms of property [effectively] ... guard[s] against the 
informational burdens that would proliferate if parties could create 
whatever property form they want to create.98 Of course, this !imitation 
of freedom causes frustration to society because people cannot create 
whatever property form they would like and are instead forced to 
conform their affairs and actions to the relatively limited suite of 
property forms that courts acknowledge and permit.99
doctrine " and have largely developed it based on the case of Johnson v. Whiton. See 
Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 67, at 22-24 (citing Johnson v. 
Whiton, 34 N.E. 542 (Mass. 1893) ). The reason for this doctrine, Merrill and Smith claim, 
is that new property types create costs in excess of their benefits and that courts can, and 
should, refuse to recognize them. See Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra 
note 67, at 7. According to Merrill and Smith, our courts do this sub silentio, without 
articulating or even acknowledging the numerus clausus doctrine. See id. at 20. 
98. This judicial limitation permits everyone "to limit his or her inquiry to whether
the interest does or does not have the features of [pre-existing] forms." Merrill & Smith, 
Optimal Standardization, supra note 67, at 33. "Perhaps the key point about the numerus 
clausus is informational: The forced standardization of property forms creates a kind of 
shorthand which, in turn, reduces information costs." Lipson, supra note 78, at 497. This 
prevents everyone from "mistakenly mak[ing] inconsistent uses of the asset or 
underus[ing] the asset." Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and 
Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD. S373, S382 (2002). [Toere is good reason to think that this numerus clausus theory 
is an ultimately inaccurate explanation for our property system's closed approach to 
estates and property form.] See Pomeroy, Shape of Property, supra note 58, at 818 ("In 
the end, then, it appears that the numerus clausus, fashioned by Merrill and Smith as a 
remedy to informational overload that is uniquely applicable to property form, is a 
misdiagnosis and does not withstand theoretical scrutiny."). [It seems more likely, rather, 
that the numerus clausus is driven by feudal history. See id. at 819-30. But this criticism 
does not weaken the informational burden analysis underlying Merrill and Smith's 
explanation. See id. at 830. As such, analyzing recovery fees in the context of this analysis 
is still appropriate and instructive.] 
99. See Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 67, at 35. [A useful]
way to understand [the !imitations of] the numerus clausus doctrine is to ... compare 
contract and property law. See, e.g., Christina Mulligan, A Numerus Clausus Principle 
for Intellectual Property, 80 TENN. L. REV. 235, 237 (2013) .... [C]ontractual 
arrangements are highly customizable, while property arrangements are not. See id. at 
237-38. This is because the default rules that govern contract law are generally alterable,
whereas "a transfer of real or tangible property is forbidden unless the transfer is
permitted by law and within one of 'a limited number of standardized forms."' Id. at 238.
When a court reviews a highly negotiated contract, it endeavors endlessly to divine the
parties' intent. See Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence
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These opposing forces drive property law toward what Merrill and 
Smith call "optimal standardization," wherein the frustration costs and 
theinformation burden costs are balanced and so result in an "optimal" 
level of homogeneity.100 This can be represented in graphic format: 
Cost 
0 Property Forms Q 
"Here, the x-axis is the number of property forms allowed, the y­
axis is cost incurred by society, and the two cost curves measure the 
social cost caused by unfettered freedom and the frustration costs 
caused by limits on agency."101 The numerus clausus, in theory, balances 
these curves and so creates the "optimal" number of property forms that 
minimize the overall costs experienced by society at large.102 
The idea is that * is the ideal number of property forms, as any number 
less than that (i.e., toward 0) involves a world where frustration costs exceed 
the informational burdens associated with the number of permissible forms, 
and any number more than that (i.e., toward Q) involves a world where the 
informational burdens associated with property forms exceed the 
frustrations costs (which are concomitantly lower, as Q grows). 
This theory, then, is an excellent description of how additional 
Rute, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 162 (1965). But "[w]hen parties try to enforce property 
rights that lie outside of the recognized forms, courts shoe-horn those rights into one of 
the existing forms." Mulligan, supra at 238 . . . . [T]his ... restriction on ... 
customization, so easily discerned when contrasted with contract law, ... [is] the 
numerus clausus. 
100. See Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 67, at 40.
101. .... This graph is derived from ane created by Merrill and Srnith, and I have 
used it a number of times in [ various articles ]. 
102. Pomeroy, Shape of Property, supra note 58, at 808-10.
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property forms affect the larger property system (driving up cost) and an 
eloquent attempt to explain our limited set of estates.103 It also nicely 
explains why recovery fees are not starkly problematic. 
As discussed above, recovery fees are not new.104 They are covenants, 
though perhaps by a different name and in a different context.105 This means 
that they fall to the right of *, in the graph above, and that the informational 
burdens associated with their existence do not exceed the frustration costs 
associated with their prohibition. Indeed, proactively banning them would 
be a mistake, as it would frustrate parties and so unnecessarily restrict rights 
and the economic interests and benefits that flow therefrom.106 
However, that does not mean that there are no issues associated with 
recovery fees. Given their relative novelty,107 they likely fall very close to *
on the graph above. They are a net positive to property law-but not by 
much-because the marginal informational burdens caused by their 
existence are high in general and high relative to their marginal decrease in 
frustration costs. 
This is acceptable in an absolute sense and certainly indicates that 
recovery fees do not need to be prohibited. But it does not mean that the 
situation is perfect. There will still be a relatively high amount of confusion 
associated with recovery fees due to their relatively high informational 
burdens.108 This is a kind of "imperfect notice," arising from the relatively 
103. Id. at 810, 810 n.63 ("I have generally referred to the 'numerus clausus' doctrine
[in much of my writing] and have, more or less, entirely attributed it to Merrill and Srnith. 
I think that is fair, given the enormous amount of attention they have brought to this 
concept .... It is worth mentioning, however, that theirs is not the only justification for 
the widely accepted idea that there is a 'closed number' of property forms in the common 
law system."). 
104. See supra Part Il.
105. See supra Part IL
106. See Merrill & Srnith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 67, at 35-37; supra
Part IL 
107. Their "newishness."
108. This confusion will likely take the form of parties that purehase property subject
to recovery fees unaware of what they are or the costs associated with them. Note that 
this is different than being completely unaware. Tue recording system, see supra Part 
111.A, will ens ure that parties have notice ( actual or constructive) of the recovery fees,
and title insurance will generally protect against any problems with such notice. See John
C. Murray, Title and Survey Issues in Commercial Real Estate Transactions, in
UNDERSTANDING THE SOPHISTICATED REAL ESTATE TRANSACTION 2003, at 55, 57-59
(Peter A. Sarasek et al. eds., 2003) (indicating that title insurance indernnifies against the
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new nature of recovery fees. Fortunately, there is a solution available that is 
short of flat prohibition, thus balancing parties' desire and need for flexibility 
and the potential costs associated therewith. 
IV. A RESTRAINED SOLUTION
Tue solution is a simple one. Because the problem is not the recovery 
fee itself but the potential for surprise or confusion, the solution is to aet to 
avoid such surprise or confusion. This can be done relatively easily, without 
prohibiting these kinds of covenants,109 by making rninor modifications to 
the current recording incentives applicable to covenants. 
Pursuant to modem recording acts, property interests are generally 
recorded so that they may take effect against third parties.110 This is true of 
recovery fees, of course, and they will almost always be duly recorded.111 But, 
as described above, recovery fees may be novel enough that such 
loss associated with nonconforming title ). However, title insurance will not protect 
against noted exceptions, id. at 76-79, and a significant part of the concem regarding 
confusion is that parties simply will not understand a noted exception that relates to 
recovery fees. Thus, Mr. X could buy a home, purehase title insurance, and ultimately 
end up being subject to recovery fees he never anticipated or planned for. 
109. Or, rather, without attempting to prohibit these sorts of covenants. See supra
note 52 and accompanying text. 
110. See supra Part III.A; see also, e.g., Robert P. Hill, Titte Repositories, Recording,
and Constructive Notice, 29 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 469, 476 (1983) ("Constructive 
notice (as used herein) is purely a creation of statute, and exists only for the purposes 
and to the extent provided in the applicable statute. In most cases, constructive notice is 
created by the proper recording of an instrument entitled to be recorded. Once such an 
instrument has been properly recorded, it gives notice of its contents to all persons, 
regardless of whether any particular person has actual knowledge thereof or even has 
reason or means to discover the existence of the document." (footnote ornitted)). 
Indeed, recording is the predominant method of providing notice in the modem world. 
See Pomeroy, Ending Surprise Liens, supra note 13, at 147 (noting that most modem 
recording acts are of the notice type, which is why recording is so effective in protecting 
one's property claim). This is not an absolute rule, of course, and there are a number of 
property interests-such as adverse possession, implied easements, claims of which 
subsequent owners have actual or inquiry notice, and others-that take effect against 
third parties, even without recording. These kinds of interests are relatively rare in the 
modem world, however, and recovery fees do not fall within this category, in any event. 
As such, any person or entity desiring to enforce a recovery fee would certainly record 
it. 
111. And, if they are not, they will not take effect and thus present no real issue. See
supra Part III.A. 
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constructive notice ends up being unsatisfying in a systematic sense.112 As 
such, the statutory scheme should require a recording of an explicit and 
specific document that clearly and plainly conveys what a recovery fee is, the 
magnitude of the recovery fee at issue, and the likely effect the recovery fee 
will have on the owner of the property. 
This may seem somewhat redundant, as the recording system is built 
around notice, generally, and around the idea that recording will put all third 
parties on constructive notice, specifically.113 Accordingly, everything that is 
recorded-including any document that provides for a recovery fee and 
attaches it to property-is public knowledge and so cannot legally surprise 
anyone. However, constructive knowledge is not actual knowledge, and, 
given the novelty discussed above, it makes sense to require a special, or 
exemplary, notification be filed on record so that there is no question about 
the nature of the fee and of its consequences.114 
This sort of requirement would both satisfy the concerns of those who 
fear the potential surprise associated with recovery fees and the systemic 
pressure to permit efficient creativity and novelty.115 Indeed, it is presumably 
for these reasons that California has adopted a statute of this nature. 
California's law specifically requires special notice of recovery fees­
highlighted to ensure that it is noticeable and including explicit 
descriptions-and, in some circumstances, examples of how the fees would 
function.116 
This, rather than outright prohibition, is the right result. It balances the 
traditional nature of these interests with the admittedly new manner in 
which they are applied, thus walking the line between over-regulation and 
under-protection. Such a system permits market participants to engage in 
free and open conduct within traditional boundaries, but in a manner that 
does not unduly surprise other property claimants. 
112. See supra Part III.B.
113. See supra text accompanying note 110.
114. Tue concept is akin to other requirements that certain rights or obligations be
specially emphasized. See, e.g., William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, Construction and 
Effect of UCC § 2-316(2) Providing that Implied Warranty Disclaimer Must Be 
"Conspicuous," 73 A.L.R.3d 248 passim (1976), Westlaw. 
115. See id. To say nothing of the economic efficiency theoretically encompassed
within a vehicle, such as this, which permits buyers and sellers to more finely dissect and 
parcel out development costs. 
116. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE§§ 1098.5, 1102.6e (West 2017).
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V. CONCLUSION
Recovery fees have received much negative publicity, but this criticism 
largely ignores the inherently traditional nature of these interests. They are 
mainly a kind of real covenant and, though fashioned in a new setting, fit 
well within this tradition. As such, they should neither be shunned nor 
prohibited, as is the current trend. That does not mean there is no need for 
any regulation, however. Given their relative novelty, it is reasonable to 
require special notice to ensure that these kinds of interests do not unduly 
interfere with market participants or their reasonable expectations. 
Requiring this sort of notice is sufficient and appropriate within our current 
U .S. property tradition. 
